If past is prologue, then the 2011 debt ceiling debate informed the 2023 debt ceiling drama Congress faced this week.
In 2011, Republican Speaker John Boehner tried to reconcile debt ceiling politics in a divided government. Back then, the Republicans controlled the House, Democrats the Senate and Barack Obama the White House. The tea party wave of 2010 delivered Republicans a substantial House majority, and with that rambunctious majority came unrealistic expectations of what could be accomplished in divided government. To mollify Republican hard-liners, the GOP House leadership team of Boehner, Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy advanced legislation dubbed “cut, cap and balance,” an aggressive measure to increase the debt limit, cut federal spending, cap future spending and allow a constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget.
McCarthy prevailed in impressive fashion with a strong debt ceiling vote among his House GOP colleagues, reinforcing his position as speaker.
This time, McCarthy, R-Calif., prevailed in impressive fashion with a strong debt ceiling vote among his House GOP colleagues, reinforcing his position as speaker. Expect McCarthy’s harshest critics to plot their next move. A motion to vacate the chair is the nuclear option for the hard-liners. But do not expect such a kamikaze move now, as it would infuriate the vast majority of the House GOP Conference. Fortunately for McCarthy, his angry detractors are not strategic thinkers, and they are likely to misfire in whatever they do.
Regardless, the concessions McCarthy made to his detractors in January to secure the speaker’s gavel have not insulated him from their never-ending wrath and hostility.
Anyone with an ounce of political sense knew “cut, cap and balance” had no chance of ever becoming law. Hard-liners insisted such legislation would be their price to vote to increase the debt ceiling. Pragmatic and moderate Republicans bristled at the notion of voting for a politically perilous bill to pacify the hard-liners who had no intention of voting for the inevitable debt ceiling compromise that Obama would sign into law. Further, the hard-liners would condemn those Republicans who voted for the compromise debt ceiling legislation, which included automatic spending cuts known as sequestration, as RINOs (Republicans in Name Only) and other disparaging terms.
One of the great challenges facing congressional leadership is managing expectations among the party base and leading the herd away from foreseeable cliffs.
One only needs to substitute the Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023 for the Cut, Cap and Balance Act of 2011, McCarthy for Boehner and President Joe Biden for Obama to understand current debt ceiling dynamics. While there are differences between the 2011 and 2023 debt ceiling spectacles — today, the GOP has a much narrower margin, McCarthy has integrated the hard-liners much more fully into the House Republican Conference, and the degree of fear, trepidation and uncertainty is greater — the fundamentals remain largely the same.
McCarthy and his leadership team touted the Limit, Save, Grow Act as the GOP response to Biden and the Democrats who refused to negotiate with Republicans on the debt ceiling, an obviously unsustainable position. While passing Limit, Save, and Grow arguably did lay down a marker Biden and the Democrats could not ignore, it also raised expectations among House GOP hard-liners, many of whom are part of the House Freedom Caucus: that this legislation unrealistically represented a firm line in the sand. Of course, the Republican hard-liners never had any intention of voting for the debt ceiling compromise skillfully negotiated by McCarthy and Biden, known as the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023.
By conventional political standards, the debt ceiling legislation reflects a serious bipartisan compromise in which Republicans can claim policy victories by imposing strict budget caps for nondefense and nonveterans discretionary spending, providing a glide path for reform of permitting, expanding work requirements for able-bodied food stamp recipients from 49 to 54 years of age and clawing back unspent Covid money. Democrats can boast the things they prevented and protected, including the climate and health provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act, extreme cuts to domestic programs and no work requirements for Medicaid recipients.
These, of course, are not conventional times, and bipartisan compromises, once celebrated, are now scorned and ridiculed by extreme elements of both parties’ political bases. “Surrender,” “capitulation” and “sellout” are words used to describe traditional legislating resulting in negotiated bipartisan agreements.
Ordinarily, Kevin McCarthy would receive not only the votes but also credit from his conference for tough negotiating that resulted in some significant, though not transformational, policy victories. Speakers Boehner and Paul Ryan were hammered relentlessly by their hard-liners not to bring bills to the House floor that could not get support from a majority of the House GOP, once known as the Hastert Rule.








