North Korea and Russia have a long, deep history dating to the beginning of the Cold War, when Moscow was the chief arms supplier and political backer of the Kim family dynasty. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s one-on-one meeting this week with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome space facility in Russia’s Far East has brought the bilateral relationship to the front pages.
Yet amid all of the headlines, it’s important not to get too carried away about what this meeting represents. Footage of Kim and Putin nonchalantly walking together like long-lost brothers might suggest the two are flirting with a strategic alliance, but the reality is more complicated. Indeed, were it not for Russia’s struggling war in Ukraine, North Korea would most likely still be an afterthought for the Russian foreign policy establishment.
Kim’s in-person dialogue with Putin (their first since April 2019) comes at a time when both leaders’ relations with the United States have significantly degraded. The bonhomie between the two, which included a toast by Kim to Russia’s victory in its “sacred fight” with the West, is driven in no small part by Moscow and Pyongyang’s shared acrimony toward Washington. Predictably, the Biden administration is none too pleased that two of its major adversaries are getting together, especially when a Russian-North Korean arms deal is on the table.
Putin and Kim have urgent needs, and both see in each other convenient partners for meeting them.
Moscow and Pyongyang’s shared threat perception of the U.S. has only grown in intensity as Washington tries to maintain sanctions against the Kim regime for its nuclear weapons development and to preserve the Western coalition that has supported Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive. That Moscow and Pyongyang are trying to find areas of cooperation is obviously troubling from a U.S. standpoint, but it makes perfect sense.
Putin and Kim have urgent needs, and both see in each other convenient partners for meeting them. Putin, for instance, finds himself in the most perilous stretch of his 23-year tenure as Russia’s ruler. His war of choice in Ukraine, soon to enter its 19th month, long ago turned into a military, economic and geopolitical disaster for him. The intense pace of the conflict has stressed Russia’s defense industrial complex, the very machinery Moscow requires to hold its defensive lines and maintain the fight into next year. Despite an uptick in military production, Moscow is expending far more munitions than it can replace.
That’s where Kim Jong Un comes in. While the North Korean army is hardly one of technological prowess or sophistication, that doesn’t matter for Putin’s purposes. The Russians need basic artillery and munitions in what can be best described as a war of attrition, if only to plug some gaps as Moscow’s defense apparatus continues to ramp up. North Korea not only has plenty of stock but an incentive to trade it for the right price. And that would include Russian food supplies (parts of the North Korean population are at risk of starvation) and technological assistance for its space and missile programs. Simply put, Putin and Kim both want something the other one has.
The shifting geopolitical climate in East Asia is also pushing Russia and North Korea into a strategic alignment. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, for instance, has advocated for possible joint military exercises between the two countries. In July, Shoigu became the first Russian defense minister since 1991 to travel to the North, where he was given a tour of its weapons systems. Moscow, in partnership with Beijing, has also used its veto power at the U.N. Security Council to block U.S.-led sanctions against Pyongyang. If it undermines Washington’s foreign policy goals, so much the better.
A closer North Korea-Russia relationship could also establish a mutually reinforcing check on U.S. ambitions — a check that has only gotten more urgent this year. The Biden administration has successfully negotiated military access agreements with the Philippines, is preparing to finance the AUKUS project, and is helping Japan and South Korea move on from their yearslong spat over trade, security and their shared war-time history.
This last pillar of the U.S. strategy in Asia is of special concern to North Korea. Driven in large part by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, the White House has managed to bring Seoul and Tokyo into the same room on matters of security and defense — something that would have been inexplicable only a few years ago. U.S., South Korean and Japanese forces have exercised numerous times, most recently on Aug. 28 when the three practiced defending against North Korean ballistic missiles. Biden, Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have pledged to regularize these drills and committed to consulting one another “in an expeditious manner” in the event of crises and provocations. For North Korea, stronger ties among the U.S., South Korea and Japan only confirm its baseline sentiment that Washington is set on enhancing its own power to their detriment. Strengthening relations with states whose ties to Washington are precarious, including Russia and China, is therefore a necessity. None of this means Moscow and Pyongyang will declare themselves formal allies anytime soon. But let’s be clear: None of this means Moscow and Pyongyang will declare themselves formal allies anytime soon. There is a big difference between deeper strategic partnership and a formal alliance commitment that would have the two states coming to one other’s defense in a crisis. For one, the Russian army has its hands full in Ukraine and isn’t in a position to make such a commitment, even if it wanted to. Putin himself indicated there would be “certain restrictions” on military cooperation with Pyongyang. The North Koreans, in turn, are notoriously averse to outsourcing their defense to foreign powers, and frankly they don’t trust anybody but themselves on such a weighty matter. However, what Kim Jong Un’s long train ride to Russia does suggest is that the geopolitics of the moment are driving them into each other’s arms. As long as the war in Ukraine persists, Putin will lean on the Kim family as a valuable source of support. And Kim, used to being an international outcast, will exploit Moscow’s desperation to the fullest.
Daniel R. DePetris
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune. 
